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William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice is typically identified in scholarship as a comedy. However, 
the play’s fourth act is troubling, as Shylock loses his wealth and is forced to convert from his ancestral 
Judaism to Christianity, undermining the play’s comic nature. In this essay, I examine what are called surface 
and fundamental conventions of comedy to discuss whether The Merchant of Venice can be classified as a 
Shakespearean comedy. Surface conventions appear regularly in comedies, but are not necessary to classify 
a play as a comedy; fundamental conventions are less immediately obvious. Although the play subscribes 
to surface conventions of comedy, it fails to present the fundamental conventions of a just universe or 
comically satisfying ending, particularly in the legal proceedings of both the trial scene and the protagonists’ 
marriages. Noting comic tropes in A Midsummer Night’s Dream in contrast to The Merchant of Venice, I argue 
that Merchant is, in fact, a “problem play” that does not fit neatly into any generic classification. While typical 
comedies offer justice in the sense that characters achieve deserved outcomes, justice in The Merchant 
of Venice is undermined through Portia’s intervention in the trial. Ultimately, I aim to understand with more 
nuance the complex role that the legal system plays in constructing genre in The Merchant of Venice, and to 
question the play’s traditional, though not universal, classification in Shakespeare scholarship as a “comedy.”
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Many scholars traditionally have identified The 
Merchant of Venice as a comedy. In a similar 
effort to describe the genre of certain works, 
Shakespeare scholars identify “problem plays” that 
do not fit easily into any of the playwright’s main 
genres (history, comedy, tragedy, and romance), 
namely the 1590s plays: All’s Well That Ends Well, 
Measure for Measure, and Troilus and Cressida. 
Much Shakespeare scholarship focuses on 
studying the conventions that help identify genres, 
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and consequently, plays which resist classification 
within genres unsettle scholarly interpretation. 
I argue that, while Merchant adheres to what I 
call the surface tropes of comedy—marriage, 
clowns, love on probation (Muir 84), “green world” 
experiences (Kernan 98), and material gain—the 
play resists the more fundamental convention of 
a just universe, in which legal justice maintains 
moral integrity and authorities properly execute 
legal proceedings. By deviating from deeper comic 





legal norms while maintaining surface tropes, 
Shakespeare’s Merchant offers a commentary 
on the authenticity of what is presented in most 
comedies as a just, or “happy,” ending. Operating 
within genre constraints, Merchant destabilizes 
and calls into question the very universe which 
it presents to the audience. First, I will present 
and define the tropes of Shakespearean comedy, 
and explain their significance to establishing 
a play as a “comedy”; secondly, I will examine 
the effects of Merchant ’s deviation from 
classical comic norms. Re-examining the typical 
classification of Merchant as a comedy, my 
analysis also reconsiders what constitutes a 
comedy in the first place, differentiating between 
surface tropes and fundamental conventions 
of comedy, which scholars often conflate. 
Scholars may identify comic convention in 
Shakespeare through surface tropes, conventions 
which are easily identifiable upon a first viewing, 
but which are, ultimately, unnecessary for the 
maintenance of the comic genre. In Shakespeare’s 
comedies, a couple, or several, usually gets 
married; characters exchange witty remarks or 
insults; clowns, or “fools,” usually appear briefly; 
and someone presents a case of deliberately or 
accidentally mistaken identity. The Merchant 
of Venice adheres to these most immediately 
identifiable indications of the comic genre. Portia 
and Bassanio, Jessica and Lorenzo, and Nerissa 
and Gratiano all marry; Act 1 sees Antonio 
and Shylock repeatedly engage in witty, if not 
necessarily funny, arguments over the nature of 
money-lending and Jewish-Christian tensions in 
Venice; Lancelot, in his encounter with Old Gobbo, 
presents the typical “purely comic” scene that 
audiences expect in Shakespearean comedies; 
and Jessica, Nerissa, and Portia each cross-
dress to conceal their true identities. Thus, on a 
first reading or viewing, the play seems to present 
few problems in the realm of genre classification.
Other, less easily identifiable tropes are also 
present in Merchant. Alvin B. Kernan, Kenneth 
Muir, and John Russell Brown identify and define 
“green world experiences,” “love on probation,” and 
“individual versus society,” respectively, as comic 
tropes. While these are more complex because 
they are less readily identifiable and more open 
to interpretive debate than clowns, mistaken 
identity, or marriage, these remain surface tropes 
because they are indicative of, but not necessary, 
to comedy. According to Kernan, “green world” 
comedies juxtapose nature with the more civilized 
court, and members of the court typically retreat 
from their busy lives to the countryside or, more 
rarely, visitors from the outside world who have 
recently had a “green world” experience upset the 
routine of the court they visit (Kernan 98). Although 
“green world” experiences are subtle in The 
Merchant of Venice, Kernan suggests that Portia’s 
foreign suitors, from countries with more Muslim 
influence, Spain and Morocco, can be associated 
with naturalism and the “green world,” contrasted 
against the “civilized” and courtly Venice.
Additionally, comedies do usually entail marriage, 
but a truly comic marriage follows a period of 
“love under probation” (Muir 54), when an obstacle 
tests a couple or suitor’s love, often to prove 
them worthy of marriage. In The Merchant of 
Venice, “probation” manifests itself in all major 
relationships. The immediately obvious example 
is the casket game, in which Portia’s suitors must 
guess which of three caskets (gold, silver, and 
lead) contains her portrait to win her hand. But 
Jessica and Lorenzo’s marriage is also contingent: 
Jessica, although “much ashamed of my exchange” 
(2.6.937), believes that donning a boy’s costume to 
leave her father’s house “with what gold and jewels 
she is furnished with” (2.4.835) will render her 
desirable to her future husband, Lorenzo. Indeed, 
only when “she hath proved herself” (2.7.958) does 
Lorenzo declare “I love her heartily” (2.7.955).
Lastly, comedy concerns the relationship of the 
individual and society (Brown 161). In Merchant, 
this is plain: as a Jew, Shylock is an outsider in 
Christian Venice, undergoing alienation at the 





hands of Antonio, who “did void your rheum upon 
my beard, / And foot me as you spurn a stranger 
cur / Over your threshold” (1.3.453). Furthermore, 
Portia and Nerissa manipulate their individuality 
in the form of gender presentation, in order to 
gain societal power and legal control over the 
trial scene. However, while Merchant presents 
characters who, due to oppression or silencing 
in Venetian society, experience tension in their 
relationships with society—Shylock because of 
his ethnicity and Portia and Nerissa because of 
their gender—“comedy can offer at best a brief 
respite from social bonds” (Demastes 17). The 
goal, then, is not to overthrow the society for the 
benefit of the individual. In fact, the emphasis 
comedy places on well-matched marriages 
suggests the opposite: both men and women must 
sacrifice their individualism for the continuation 
of society in the family (Demastes 150).
While the “green world,” “love on probation,” and 
“individual versus society” tropes may be more 
nuanced than marriage or mistaken identity, 
they are still fundamentally surface conventions. 
A play which neglects, for example, the simple 
mistaken identity trope may still be a comedy; 
likewise, leaving out the more complex “love 
on probation” trope does not threaten a play’s 
comic status. While A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
is a traditional and straightforward pastoral 
comedy (even considered Shakespeare’s “most 
perfect” comedy), it presents neither mistaken 
identity nor love on probation in the traditional 
manner. Although Puck’s interference with the 
four lovers results in confused emotion, Lysander, 
Demetrius, Hermia, and Helena do not at any 
point actually mistake one another’s identities. 
Furthermore, while, in Merchant, suitors must 
pass the casket game to earn marriage, in 
Midsummer, lovers are more arbitrarily subjected 
to the whims of the fairies Oberon and Puck, 
and have no specific tests they must pass to 
prove themselves. Nevertheless, juxtaposing the 
chaos and disorder of the natural fairy world with 
the order and justice of the court, Midsummer 
maintains the most important comic convention: a 
comically just universe which dispenses authentic, 
benevolent justice for deserving characters.
Although conformity to surface conventions of 
comedy establishes Merchant as a “comedy” in 
the realm of popular entertainment, deviance from 
fundamental conventions introduces a tension 
between law and moral justice, which invites the 
audience to question the law’s relationship to 
morality and justice outside the theatrical context. 
Ultimately, while comic conventions have an 
ethical dimension, they are especially focussed 
on the legal methods of carrying out these ethics, 
explicitly or implicitly. When the legal system fails—
as, I argue, it does in The Merchant of Venice—the 
assumption that the universe is fundamentally 
“just” falls under the audience’s scrutiny, and 
the genre begins to destabilize along with the 
legal system. Comedy, following its characters 
from repression to liberation, and concerning the 
need for “social regeneration,” uses law as the 
embodiment of moral justice (Denvir 825). Denvir 
notes that “If law is an attempt to bring regenerative 
order to an otherwise chaotic world, then comedy 
is a fictive analogue” (825). In Merchant, the law 
must intervene to maintain order when Antonio 
and Shylock’s conflict reaches a chaotic climax. 
The law, for Shylock, must operate as a mandate 
to collect on the legally binding (if morally 
dubious) contract he made with Antonio. Denvir 
associates properly executed legal proceedings 
with reconciliation, and thus, identifies The 
Merchant of Venice as a “failed comedy” because 
“the necessary reconciliation never really comes 
off” (828). While in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
Lysander and Demetrius are properly reconciled 
with Hermia and Helena by virtue of the legal 
process of marriage, in The Merchant of Venice, 
Shylock is never reconciled with Antonio; rather, 
legal processes actively prevent reconciliation 
by prompting Antonio to “offer mercy” (ironically, 
in the form of punishment) to Shylock.





Maslen, too, identifies the “mature comedies” 
as “ambiguous and doubtful” because of their 
relationships with legal proceedings. Although 
in Shakespeare’s time women were allowed in 
the courtroom only as “ears,” Portia becomes the 
dominant voice in the legal space (Maslen 84). 
But Portia manipulates the law and “deviates from 
contractual simplicity…motivated by the racism 
that is endemic in Shakespeare’s Venice” (84). 
Entering the courtroom with only an unverified 
letter as her mandate, Portia quickly becomes 
the highest acting legal authority save the Duke 
himself. Portia argues that “There is no power in 
Venice / Can alter a decree established” (4.1.2135), 
despite the fact that Shylock’s bond would never 
be upheld in English court (Sale 14). Therefore, 
from her first legal judgments in the courtroom, 
Portia’s version of legal justice would unsettle an 
English audience. Quickly moving her argument 
from exhortations to mercy to legal loopholes, 
Portia’s presence unsteadies the defined order 
of legal proceedings. Unqualified as a lawyer and 
disguised as a man in a space which normally 
excludes women’s voices, it is first and foremost 
her legal intervention which transforms The 
Merchant of Venice from comedy into “problem 
play.” Ironically, though Portia lauds mercy as 
“an attribute to God himself” (4.1.2110), it is 
precisely her unwillingness to show any mercy to 
Shylock which calls the play’s legal proceedings 
into question. Her declaration, then, in the trial 
scene, can easily be reversed to address herself, 
and all the play’s Christians: “Therefore, Jew, / 
Though justice be thy plea, consider this: / That 
in the course of justice none of us / Should see 
salvation” (4.1.2112). Justice is Portia’s plea for 
Shylock; but justice, then, becomes associated 
with extreme punishment when, in actuality, 
justice implies getting what one rightfully, or 
legally, deserves. The legal processes of The 
Merchant of Venice are disturbing because they 
allow the improper application of the law at 
Shylock’s expense, through “the transformation 
of a case about a private contract into a criminal 
trial” (14). Perhaps in the course of Portia’s 
hyper-just punishment, “none of us / Should see 
salvation,” but it is simply the destruction wreaked 
by such justice which demonstrates how the 
legal system has been misused against Shylock
Justice, then, in The Merchant of Venice, is 
perverted. Portia, likely knowingly (given her 
sharp wit, it is unlikely that she really believes her 
“mercy” speech will change Shylock’s mind about 
upholding the bond), goads Shylock until “by direct 
or indirect attempts / He seek the life of any citizen 
[Antonio]” (4.1.2274), ensuring the possibility of 
extorting his fortune and forcing his conversion. 
Essentially, Portia manipulates the legal system, 
designed to dispense proper justice in line with 
moral righteousness, to re-establish social 
dominance over Shylock. While Shylock may not 
be innocent in his pursuit of Antonio’s life, Portia 
led him to believe that he legally held the upper 
hand. Yet, once Portia turns the court against him 
on the basis of the bond demanding no blood, only 
flesh, his disadvantaged position in Venetian social 
hierarchies leaves him vulnerable to be legally 
misused. Shylock is thus deprived of his livelihood, 
forced to become a Christian, and commanded 
to bestow his fortune upon the Christian, who 
disdains him, and his daughter, who betrayed him. 
Examining the destabilization of legal 
conventions in comedy also exposes the fissures 
in Shakespeare’s representations of surface 
conventions in Merchant, especially the most 
critically characteristic of these, love and marriage. 
In keeping with the “love under probation” trope, 
marriage, notably a legal process, is usually the 
object of some contention in Shakespearean 
comedies, as in the convoluted relationships 
of Lysander, Demeter, Hermia, and Helena in 
A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Yet, in almost all 
circumstances, marriage resolves contention and 
reconciles characters before play’s end: everyone 
in Midsummer eventually falls in love with the right 
person. Most importantly, reconciliation in comedy 
is equally favourable for everyone involved. But 
in The Merchant of Venice, Jessica and Lorenzo’s 





marriage never undergoes such reconciliation with 
Shylock, as he declares “I have a daughter—Would 
be any of the stock of Barabbas had been her 
husband / Rather than a Christian!” (4.1.2218). The 
suitability of each husband is called into question 
throughout the fourth and fifth acts, as Bassanio 
declares “But life itself, my wife, and all the world 
/ Are not with me esteemed above [Antonio’s] 
life” (4.1.2203). The ring game, too, exposes the 
fissures in the protagonists’ marriages, when 
Portia and Nerissa, in disguise, coerce Benvolio 
and Lorenzo into giving them rings which the 
men had promised to keep, only to accuse their 
husbands of adultery before finally claiming 
to have retrieved the rings by sleeping with the 
lawyer and clerk. While, in an ideal comedy (one 
which upholds the fundamental convention of 
comic legal justice), men and women sacrifice 
individuality for the sake of marriage, both Portia 
and Nerissa assert their individuality at the 
potential expense of their marriages. Furthermore, 
marriages highlight the divisions between 
individuality and society: marriage detaches 
Jessica from her Jewish “tribe” and grafts her 
onto Christian Venetian society, and marriage 
prompts Portia to offer her individual wealth and 
influence at the service of law, a facet of society.
Lawrence declares that problem plays “are 
concerned, not with the pleasant and fantastic 
experiences of life, but with painful experiences 
and with the darker complexities of human 
nature” (Lawrence 3). While he addresses only 
the traditionally identified problem plays, I argue 
that scholars can fittingly include The Merchant 
of Venice in the same category. Because of 
its critical representation of legal justice and 
morality, which in turn destabilizes the otherwise 
infallible institution of marriage, Shakespeare 
offers in Merchant a play which is “too serious 
and analytic to fit the commonly accepted 
conception of comedy” (5). By focussing on legal 
(mis)proceedings and the execution of justice, 
Shakespeare invites the audience to consider 
how they conceive of justice in the first place, 
and whether society can properly dispense real 
justice. Furthermore, witnessing the disastrous 
(for some) consequences of a dysfunctional legal 
system “guarantees that audiences cannot simply 
respond with relief to the defeat of Shylock” (Sale 
20). Rather, they are drawn into and invested in the 
consequences of a failing legal system, and thus 
motivated to self-reflection and possibly even 
legal action. Either way, structuring the play’s legal 
proceedings to elicit such a response suggests 
that The Merchant of Venice is, indeed, too 
analytically and critically motivated to be classified 
alongside Shakespeare’s more truly comic works.
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